

29 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Assistant Director, Research and Reports

SUBJECT: AD/SI Comment on [REDACTED] OCI Weekly Item STATINTL

STATINTL

1. It is not really clear why the AD/SI chose to complain about this piece. He may assume that OHR's responsibilities in the field of Soviet survey and exploration work apply only to Antarctica. He may have been put off by the number of physical-science expressions in the item. Finally, or also, he may have been led to comment at the urging of the Chief, Astro-Geophysical Branch, General Sciences Division, whose general unfriendliness was accentuated in this instance by the disclosure of inferiority in an OSI draft (for the Scientific Intelligence Digest) when the [REDACTED] initiated piece came to OSI for coordination. In any event, OHR is clean.

STATINTL

2. The Geography Division is accountable for a running inventory on foreign areas. The Special Research Branch accomplishes most of this inventory for Polar areas. More specifically, it recommends and carries out "research on the intelligence significance of geographic survey and mapping operations in Polar areas" (Office Regulation 1-13, p. 115). By "geographic survey" is meant survey operations relating to the character and distribution of surface features, climates, animals, peoples and their products, etc. The task includes a sub-contracting from the D/CG area branches of routine intelligence monitoring of activities by non-Soviet countries around the Poles, so that undesirable fragmentation will not occur. Consistent with this mission, [REDACTED] is, of course, the SISSTATINTL the DD/I for Polar intelligence matters. What may confuse people at times is that the bulk of Special Research Branch production time is devoted to the topically complex fields of USSR mapping, Soviet target location accuracies, and Antarctica. The latter is particularly demanding of [REDACTED] personal time, since he represents CIA as the intelligence-support member of the Inter-Agency Committee on Antarctica, and the activity may give some persons the impression that Antarctic research is his "normal" work. In fact, it is merely the most evident.

STATINTL

3. In addition to review studies, briefings, interdepartmental-committee support, and OCI Weekly items (self-initiated and on demand), the Polar intelligence activity sustains our capability for producing broad regional reference aids such as GE 60-1 (attached), which State requested for use in developing a U.S. position for the 1960 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. [REDACTED] sticks to recording and describing

in a regional context, and leaves capabilities and intentions to OSI. There is no duplication, but there will appear to be periodically an overlap of topical interests, and in such cases (as the instant one) normal coordination machinery operates. We don't see that there is an issue.

4. I am inclined to feel that an oral reply to the AD/SI, using much of the above thoughts as you wish, would be the best disposition of the matter. His comment was passed to OHR informally and with diffidence, and a formal written response might encourage an escalation of something that shouldn't have come up at all.

STATINTL

5. At my request [REDACTED] has prepared a statement related to this current situation and has effectively reviewed not only background but philosophy concerning our work program vis-a-vis OSI. You may find it useful in your response to the AD/SI.

[REDACTED]
Chief, Geographic Research

STATINTL

Enclosures:

1. CIA/RR OR GO-1, Territorial and Sovereignty Problems of the Arctic
2. The Rationale for D/SI Intelligence Research on the Arctic Basin

STATINTL

OHR:CH/G: [REDACTED] :jmc/5061(29 April 1964)

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SECRET #1

CIA/IR GE G-1*

TERRITORIAL AND SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEMS OF THE ARCTIC

March 1960

*Copy of report sent as enclosure with the original
of memo only

25 April 1964

The Nationale for D/OS Intelligence Research on the Arctic Basin

1. The immediate cause of the protest to our OCI article was a feeling by the Chief, Astro-Geophysics Branch, AGR/OSD, that they had been scooped. [redacted] who had been assigned about a year ago to cover Polar Research in AGR, came down to see [redacted] with the OSI coordination copy of the OCI article, and at the same time brought his own draft note, for the SID, on the establishment of NP-13. From his own actions and questions concerning the facts in the OCI article, it was clear that he was perturbed about not having all the facts and not having given more comprehensive treatment to the Soviet High Latitude Expedition as a whole -- of which the launching of NP-13 was but one facet. The SID note was so brief in detail and substance that no discrepancies were noted, except for our agreeing to a rounding of the 700-kilometer value to 800 instead of 850 miles in the OCI article.

2. The comment of the AD/BI reflects some fundamental questions that arise out of his unawareness of the nature of D/OS geographic intelligence research in general, and the history of coverage to Polar areas in particular.

a. The coverage of Soviet polar activities dates back to the late 1940's and represents an integral part of the intelligence coverage of the USSR as a whole, including Soviet activities in environmental research -- climate, physiography, geology, soils, vegetation, surveying and mapping (topography), etc. As a result of this early and comprehensive coverage, the USSR Branch was able to identify and evaluate the significance of the experimental air-lift expedition techniques that were developed and tested from 1945 to 1952 -- when the second drift station was launched (the first was in 1937). When the first full-scale High Latitude Expedition was launched in 1954, we were the first to recognize (1) the basis for this high degree of sophistication in field methodology, and (2) the imminence of the expansion of Soviet Polar research into Antarctica. Since OCI had no regional specialists on the Polar areas, D/OS provided support to OCI in writing brief articles or collaborating with analysts of what is now the OCI Military Division. In addition, support was provided to the Department of State in those early days on the problems caused by the Soviet application of the sector principle in their sovereignty claims to the Arctic Basin.

b. By early summer 1955, we had written two staff papers to the DO/I outlining the significance and implication of these Arctic developments. Recommendations were made to provide intelligence support to the OGB Working Group on Antarctica, and to establish a comparable group on the Arctic. The first comprehensive intelligence study prepared (1955) in the intelligence community on Soviet exploration and research

in Antarctica also provided the first summary of Soviet Arctic operations, since the latter was the progenitor to Soviet Antarctic interests and activities. After attending several meetings of the OCB Group on Antarctica, [REDACTED] was designated by the DD/I, early in 1956, as an alternate CIA representative.

c. The Arctic group was never organized because there was no NSC policy paper to warrant the establishment of a Working Group. When the proposal for an exchange US-USSR overflight of the Arctic Basin developed out of an international IGY meeting, an ad hoc working group was set up under the OCB, and [REDACTED] was adviser to the CIA representative, [REDACTED]. After the proposal aborted, the OCB Working Group on Antarctica was charged, in January 1957, to handle Arctic matters on an ad hoc basis.

3. From the foregoing, one point must be emphasized. By the nature of both the environmental factors and by virtue of Soviet research philosophy, Polar research activity is indivisible. The word "Antarctic" was added to the original name of the Soviet Arctic Scientific Research Institute; field operational personnel are rotated between the Arctic and Antarctic, the same organizations work on both areas, and the Soviets stress the need to make cooperative environmental studies. Also, since Soviet activities never operate in a political vacuum, it is necessary to discern the politico-strategic trends in these environmentally comparable, but politically different, areas. With political stability brought to Antarctica, based in part on exchanges of personnel and scientific data, interest is now developing within the US Government to try to extend the exchange policies to the Arctic. For a variety of reasons, therefore, [REDACTED] maintains currency on Soviet developments and activities in both areas. Since OSI does not have any regional specialists on either region -- the expertise is not easily acquired in a brief period of time -- they have continued to depend on [REDACTED] to fill this gap in current intelligence production.

4. The contrast of AOS/SI activities in this field is genuine. Although OSI operated in the geophysical sciences for many years, an assignment of area responsibility for the Polar areas as such was made only in June 1956, to [REDACTED] a geographer who came to OSI from the Army Map Service in 1951. The first paper on the Arctic was published in 1955, concerning itself with oceanography. A more comprehensive treatment on the Arctic appeared in September 1956, and the first paper on Soviet Antarctic activities did not come out until 1957. [REDACTED] left OSI in late 1960 (to join ONS), and was not replaced until 1963 by [REDACTED] who is a physicist and not an environmental scientist. OSI's major production on Soviet Arctic and Antarctic research since then has been a digest of two D/OS studies, one on the Arctic and the other on the Antarctic.

5. There are basic differences in the approaches and objectives pursued by D/OS and AOS/SI which are distinctive and supplementary rather than competitive and duplicating.

a. As part of the D/CG philosophy, emphasis is on the coverage and distribution of phenomena -- social and environmental -- as these are interrelated into distinctive regional and sub-regional patterns. Since such a small portion of the earth has been mapped (topographic, geologic, ethnic, political), it is necessary that terrestrial research, exploration, and the various surveying and mapping activities be followed and assessed for cross-checking with the geographic descriptions in available articles, monographs, books, and maps, and that gaps in this coverage become known. Moreover, in the communist countries where research and all field-survey operations are completely planned and purposeful, the ultimate intelligence challenge is to identify the political, economic, and strategic goals that generated these activities.

b. The objectives of scientific intelligence, on the other hand, are discipline-oriented to provide expertise in depth. Thus, the main emphasis is on the qualitative aspects of instrumentation, methods, theories, personnel, and organizations. The quantitative applications of these capabilities are to a large degree the field of economic research, while the horizontal, or areal location, aspects are the interest of geographic research. OSI does not concern itself with the extent of the mapping of geophysical phenomena, nor how they interact with associated social phenomena in any given region in a time perspective. There is no basis for the erroneous OSI conclusion that geographic intelligence is competitive. D/CG, in its intelligence production -- except in geodesy and gravimetry -- has never injected itself into the qualitative aspects of science where OSI has been or is involved in its research program.

c. The AD/SI may be advised that D/CG production -- and the OSI article is an illustration of this point -- is concerned only with environmental research which bears on types of activities in their horizontal or distributional extent. He can be reassured that D/CG draws the line at any qualitative appraisals and assessments of capabilities that concern the scientific disciplines themselves. D/CG, in fact, is dependent together with the other components of CIA on OSI for such intelligence. The coordination process operates to ensure that these distinctive judgments are brought together in the interest of sound CIA intelligence production.